We provide direct evidence that different investor classes use different information sets. Specifically, investors initiating small trades behave as if their earnings expectations resemble inefficient seasonal random walk (SRW) forecasts. The expectations of large traders, however, more closely resemble analysts' forecasts which are significantly more accurate. By comparing analyst and SRW forecasts, we form predictable components of SRW forecast errors that are able to predict both small-trader buying activity and stock returns around earnings announcements. These results suggest that an ex ante identifiable subset of investors holds systematically biased expectations and that those holding these beliefs affect stock prices.
traders tend to buy (sell) when the errors are positive (negative), only that they trade more when the absolute magnitude of the error is large. Indeed, Hirshleifer et. al. (2002) present evidence suggesting that individual investors may exhibit more abnormal net buying after bad news announcements than after good news announcements. We construct a different experiment and use recent tools from the market microstructure literature to better understand the relationship between forecast errors and investor behavior.
Specifically, we extend prior research by showing that small traders' net buying activity is significantly positively associated with signed SRW forecast errors. That is, the greater (more positive) the SRW forecast error, the more likely small traders are to buy. Further, we show that large trader's buying activity is positively associated with signed analysts' forecast errors. That is, small traders seem to respond to the sign and magnitude of SRW forecast errors, while large traders seem to respond to the sign and magnitude of the more-accurate analysts' forecast errors. These results are consistent with large sets of investors, classified on the basis of trade size, holding different pre-announcement earnings expectations.
The results therefore show that investors categorized by trade size base their buying and selling actions on different information sets. In fact, the correlation between net buying activity around earnings announcements of the smallest and largest trade-size categories is slightly negative. These results show clearly that, on average, investors who initiate small trades hold, or at least behave as if they hold, earnings expectations that resemble an inefficient and inferior model of earnings, while those who initiate large trades do not. We do not assert that this behavior is necessarily illogical. The magnitudes of both the costs and the benefits associated with obtaining different types of forecasts are obviously different for large and small investors. We simply document that the different groups behave in predictably different ways.
Further, we dichotomize SRW forecast errors into predictable and unpredictable components based on analysts' forecasts. The predictable component of the SRW forecast error is positively associated with both small traders' propensity to buy stock and with stock returns around earnings announcements. In other words, both small-trader buying activity and stock returns around earnings announcements are partially predictable prior to the earnings announcement by simply comparing analyst and SRW forecasts. Finally, results indicate that the ability to predict stock returns around earnings announcements increases in the proportion of overall trading that is attributable to small traders.
Although results indicate that stock returns around earnings announcements are predictable ex ante, we do not attempt to show that these returns exceed trading costs and, therefore, we do not claim that they represent a profitable trading rule. Similarly, although our results suggest that large traders use an information set that is superior to that of small traders, we do not attempt to show that they benefit at the expense of small traders over longer windows. The purpose of this paper is rather to show that investors, who can be classified ex ante on the basis of their trade size, hold and act on systematically different beliefs.
Further, the group of investors we expect to be least sophisticated holds systematically inferior earnings expectations. Finally, this group of investors appears to affect stock prices. While these results might suggest that small traders, as unsophisticated investors, may give rise to anomalies such as post-earningsannouncement drift, we do not attempt to establish such a link and believe there is much work to be done before such a connection can be proven.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we motivate and state specific testable hypotheses. In the following section we lay out the data, sample, and research methods. The nextto-last section presents the empirical results and the final section concludes.
Hypotheses
The model we have in mind is a simple one which probably most resembles Varian (1986) . Prior to observing the earnings announcement, each investor holds the amount of stock that he or she has determined to be optimal. The optimal amount of stock is given by the investor's demand function which is increasing in the difference between the investor's estimate of share value and the market price. The investor's estimate of share value is an increasing function of his or her earnings expectation. Upon 3 The real situation is slightly more complex than described here. First, even though announced earnings is the same for all investors, more-and less-sophisticated investors may view earnings differently. Specifically, more-sophisticated investors may back out non-value-relevant or less-persistent components of earnings. Second, following an earnings announcement, market price as well as the investor's perceived value will normally change. Generally, these price movements will not alter the predicted direction of trades as described above, but they can have implications. We discuss findings related to both of these issues in the results section.
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observing the earnings announcement, each investor revises his or her estimate of firm value. When observed earnings is higher (lower) than the investor's expectation, it causes the investor to revise estimated share value upward (downward) and that causes the investor to attempt to buy (sell) shares of stock. While investors observe an identical earnings signal, they revise their estimates of value differently-and therefore trade differently-because of divergent prior beliefs. 3 We propose two available earnings estimates as likely candidates to proxy for investors' prior earnings beliefs. As stated in the introduction, prior research suggests that stock prices may reflect earnings expectations that are biased toward SRW forecasts. Also as discussed above, the SRW model is significantly less accurate than the best available estimate of earnings-analysts' forecasts. Combining the results of Hand (1989) and Bernard and Thomas (1990) with the analysis of Easley and O'Hara (1987) , who suggest that investors initiating small trades are less well informed than those initiating larger trades, we hypothesize that the earnings expectations of small traders more closely resemble the less-accurate SRW predictions rather than they do analysts' forecasts.
We test this by examining the net buying activity of these investors in response to earnings announcements. Net buying activity, defined formally in the next section, is a measure of the buy-sell imbalance around an earnings announcement for a particular trade-size category (e.g., less than 500 shares).
If small traders' earnings expectations resemble SRW forecasts, then SRW-forecast errors (as opposed to analyst-forecast errors) should trigger trading among this group. Specifically, the revision of perceived share value and therefore the net buying activity of small investors should be positively correlated with SRW forecast errors. The first hypothesis therefore is:
The net buying activity of small traders at the time of an earnings announcement is more highly associated with the SRW forecast error than with the analyst forecast error.
Similarly, investors who place large orders are believed to be better informed. We therefore hypothesize that their prior earnings expectations should more closely resemble the predictions of the most accurate model available, analysts' forecasts, rather than those of a naive time-series model such as the SRW.
By the same logic as above, large traders' net buying activity should be positively correlated with analyst forecast errors. The second hypothesis is:
The net buying activity of large traders at the time of an earnings announcement is more highly associated with the analyst forecast error than with the SRW forecast error.
We summarize the predictions of the first two hypotheses in the figure below: If we find that small traders behave as if they use a naive signal, the next logical question is whether their trades affect prices. We begin by determining whether small transactions move counter to actual price movements that occur around earnings announcements. While it is possible that small traders affect stock prices, it is unlikely that they are the primary determinant in price movements. We hypothesize therefore that small trades tend to run counter to the direction of price movements during earnings announcement periods.
The net buying activity of small traders is negatively associated with actual price movements around earnings announcements.
If we find that small traders run counter to stock price movements, that does not necessarily imply that they actually affect prices. We test this by determining whether the stock returns around earnings announcements are more closely associated to SRW errors when small-trader activity is high. These tests are similar to those performed by Walther (1997) . She hypothesizes that the marginal investor of smaller firms, that are followed by fewer analysts and have a smaller fraction of their shares held by institutions, is more likely to be unsophisticated. We would expect our measure of small-trader activity to be negatively correlated to the firm-specific measures of investor sophistication that she examines. We therefore test for a relation between our measure of small-trader activity and the importance of SRW forecast errors in explaining stock returns around earnings announcements, both before and after controlling for the firmspecific variables used by Walther. The fourth hypothesis is: 4 For stocks averaging three or more transactions per day, market makers were required to honor their quoted prices for up to 1000 shares between January 1, 1993 and January 31, 1994 , 500 shares between February 1, 1994 and March 27, 1995 , and 1000 shares from March 28, 1995 through the passage of the Order Handling Rules, which were phased in throughout 1997. See Schultz (1997, 1998) and Battalio, Hatch and Jennings (1997) for more information on SOES and its affect on trading in the Nasdaq market.
5 For more information on the Order Handling Rules, see Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz (1999) . 
Description of the Variables and Sample
Our sample begins with all earnings announcements identified by Compustat for Nasdaq stocks between April 1, 1993 and December 31, 1996 . Two features of the Nasdaq trading environment during this time period make it an attractive laboratory for our experiment. The first is Nasdaq's Small Order Execution System (SOES), a computerized system for routing orders from retail investors (via brokerage firms) to Nasdaq market makers for automatic execution. The rules governing the usage of SOES during our sample period make it very unlikely that sophisticated investors with information placed small trades. The second is the mechanism used by Nasdaq to open and close trading in its stocks each day. In contrast to other markets that use single-price auctions to open and/or close trading, Nasdaq market participants simply begin executing and reporting trades when the market opens and stop when it closes. Focusing on earnings announcements in Nasdaq stocks allows us to analyze all trades during normal market conditions. We describe each of these features in more detail below before discussing our variables and sample selection criteria.
Why Nasdaq data from 1993 through 1996?
After the market crash of 1987, Nasdaq officials made market maker participation in SOES mandatory. As a result, Nasdaq market makers were required to post and honor bid and ask prices for a preset number of shares (typically 1000). 4, 5 These rule changes made it difficult for market makers to back away from their quotes and they guaranteed investors the chance to automatically execute their orders (via their brokers) at posted prices.
6 During our sample period, Nasdaq market makers rarely offered more than 1000 shares at their posted quotes. 7 The NASD introduced several rules throughout the nineties that made it difficult for institutional investors to break-up large orders and execute them using SOES. See NASD Notices to Members 88-103 (no professional trading on SOES), 90-57 (no market maker agency orders on SOES), 91-67 (time parameters limiting frequency of order entry), and 94-1 (temporary reduction in order size parameters).
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In this trading environment, it is unlikely that wealthy investors who have or think they have valuerelevant information would place market orders for less than the number of shares guaranteed by SOES.
Conversely, since Nasdaq market makers are not obligated to transact orders larger than the SOES minimum at quoted prices, an investor purchasing (selling) more shares than are guaranteed by SOES will typically transact at a price that is higher (lower) than the posted ask (bid). 6 This suggests a sophisticated investor would never place an order for a few hundred shares more or a few hundred shares less than the number of shares guaranteed by SOES. Obviously, as suggested by Easley and O'Hara (1987) , there are instances in which sophisticated investors have information that justifies bearing the execution price risk associated with acquiring positions well in excess of the SOES maximum. While one might expect these investors to breakup their orders and execute them via SOES, access to SOES was limited to non-professional, retail investors during our sample period.
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Following this reasoning, we examine six groups of trades based on size: 100 to 400 shares, 500
shares, 600 to 900 shares, 1000 shares, 1100 to 4900 shares, and 5000 and more shares. We examine 500
share and 1000 share trades separately since the number of shares that market makers are required to transact at their quotes via SOES vacillates between 500 and 1000 shares during our sample period. We select 5000
shares as the cutoff for our largest trade size category reasoning that SOES was unavailable for orders this large. We expect that trades in the 100 to 400 share category correspond to the trading interests of naive, unsophisticated investors with little information and trades in the 5000 and more shares category correspond to the trading interests of wealthy, sophisticated investors with access to superior information.
In contrast to the Nasdaq market prior to 1997, a trader sending a market order to the NYSE could expect it to be manually executed at the posted price as long as the order's size did not exceed the quoted depth (which may have changed while the order was in transit). 8 Since the depths on the floor of the NYSE vary widely across stocks and through time, there are no natural trade-size bins that isolate the trading interests of sophisticated and naive investors. Indeed, the introduction of the Order Handling Rules in January of 1997, which reduced the guaranteed minimum number of shares at the inside quotes to 100 shares, eliminated 'natural' trade-size bins from the Nasdaq market.
The second advantage of using data from Nasdaq rather than the NYSE centers on the way each market begins and ends trading in its stocks. The NYSE uses a single-price call auction that transforms multiple trades into a single reported transaction to open and close trading while Nasdaq reports individual trades separately through the trading day. Since researchers cannot decompose the results of a NYSE call auction into its component trades from publicly available data, data from the opening and closing auctions on the NYSE cannot be used to study investor behavior. Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) document the importance of the opening auction using the NYSE's TORQ database, which contains detailed order data announcements (see Greene and Watts, 1996) , the exclusion of trades participating in the NYSE's opening and closing call auctions may lead to biased inferences. For these reasons, Nasdaq trading data prior to 1997
provides a more powerful test of our hypotheses than data from the NYSE or more recent data from Nasdaq.
9 Both the Compustat and I/B/E/S datasets adjust for stock splits over time. In order to use a common actual earnings figure for both the SRW model and for analysts' forecasts, we unadjust all earnings and forecasts to reflect the numbers that were actually announced (i.e., we use the adjustment factors provided by Compustat and I/B/E/S to undo the adjustments for splits). As the deflator for both forecast errors we use unadjusted share prices from CRSP. We require consistency between Compustat and I/B/E/S announcement dates to ensure that the I/B/E/S forecasts are aligned with Compustat earnings (as well as with transactions and returns data).
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Construction of Earnings Variables
As noted earlier, our initial sample begins with earnings announcements available from Compustat is the analyst forecast minus the SRW forecast deflated by price.
To allow for outliers and non-linearities in the relationship between forecast errors, trading activity, and returns, we follow Bernard and Thomas (1990) and code AFE, SRWFE, and PSRWFE by within quarter decile. To aid in the economic interpretation of our regression results, we follow Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall (1992) and equally space the coded scores from -0.5 (lowest decile) to +0.5 (highest decile).
Construction of Return and Control Variables
To investigate the relationship between trading by different investor clienteles and returns around earnings announcements, we require daily return data from CRSP. Our return variable, ANCAR, is the threeday cumulated stock return minus the equally-weighted return for the same period for the Nasdaq marketcapitalization decile assigned by CRSP. Earnings announcements for which the data needed to compute ANCAR are not available are eliminated from our sample. We also use three variables to control for firmspecific factors identified by Walther (1997) as being associated with investor sophistication. The first,
INST. FRAC., is taken from CDA Spectrum and is the fraction of the firm's shares held by institutions that file Form 13f with the SEC in the calendar quarter prior to the earnings announcement. The second, ANALYSTS, is the number of analysts providing quarterly earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement. The third, SIZE, is the market capitalization of the firm in thousands of dollars at the beginning of the calendar year taken from CRSP.
Construction of Microstructure Variables
We obtain the microstructure data for this study from the New York Stock Exchange's Trade and Quote (TAQ) database, which contains intraday trades and quotes for all securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the Nasdaq Stock Market. Each quote record indicates the underlying stock, the trading venue posting the quote, the date and time of the quote, the bid and ask prices and quantities, and a condition code indicating whether the quote is an opening or a closing quote. Each trade record indicates the underlying stock, the date and time the trade was reported, the venue reporting the trade, the transaction size and price, and codes indicating whether the trade is subsequently cancelled or is made with other 'special' conditions.
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Because the TAQ database is 11 Lee and Radhakrishna (1996) , Odders-White (2000), and Finucane (2000) Thus, the LR algorithm cannot classify opening trades executed at the midpoint of the execution-time 12 Since most trades on the NYSE are reported manually, the times at which trades in NYSE-listed securities actually occur precede the times reported on the TAQ database. For this reason, Lee and Ready (1991) , Blume and Goldstein (1997) , and others suggest lagging the execution times reported in TAQ by five to fifteen seconds before matching trades and quotes. However, Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000) note that most trades in Nasdaq stocks are reported electronically and find there is no need to use a lag when matching trades and quotes for Nasdaq stocks.
13 Specifically, we eliminate trades with a Condition Code of 'Z' or 'G' and trades that have a Correction Code that is not equal to zero or one.
14 Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) is one of many papers that uses data screens similar to those employed in this paper.
14 National Best Bid or Offer (NBBO) nor can it classify the trades that follow these opening trades until the NBBO changes or a trade is executed at a different price.
To implement the LR algorithm, we must first create an NBBO for each stock in our sample and find benchmark execution-time NBBOs for each trade in our sample. At each moment in the trading day, a stock's NBBO is created by taking the highest bid and the lowest offer (i.e., the best prices) quoted by venues on which the stock is traded. Following Ellis, Michaely, and O'Hara (2000), we then use the execution-time NBBO with no lag as our benchmark quotes.
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The typing of buys and sells necessitates the elimination of trades reported late or out of sequence since they cannot reliably be matched with execution-time NBBOs. 13 We also eliminate any trade with a transaction price more than $5.00 away from the previous price on that day and trades with no reported quantities as 'obvious' data errors. We eliminate trades for which the benchmark NBBO is invalid (i.e., the trade is reported during a trading halt) and trades that cannot be classified by the Lee and Ready algorithm from our analysis. Finally, we only consider trades executed between 9:30 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. since the timestamps for trades (needed for the LR algorithm) become less reliable outside of normal market hours.
14 From our sample of trades classified as buys and sells, we construct a measure of abnormal net buying activity for each of the six trade-size categories. For each category, we begin by subtracting the number of sell trades during the three trading days centered on the earnings announcement date from the 15 Results presented in Lee (1992) suggest using a non-event period centered ten trading days away from the earnings announcement is more than adequate. Moving the non-event period to twenty trading days before and after the announcement does not alter our results. NETYBUY i may be interpreted as the abnormal buy-sell imbalance as a fraction of total non-event trades.
So, if the number of event buys exceeds non-event buys by 10% of normal trade volume (both buys and sells) and event sells are at the normal non-event level, then NETBUY i equals 10%. To ensure our measure of abnormal net buying activity is reasonable, we require each earnings announcement in our sample to have an average of ten trades per day in each of the three-day trading windows. 40% of the shares of the typical sample firm. ANUM is a measure of analyst following and is defined as the number of analysts reporting quarterly earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement. Since a measure of analyst earnings expectation is required for the hypotheses, the sample is constrained to firm-quarters for which at least one analyst reports to I/B/E/S. The mean (median) number of analysts reporting forecasts is 3.89 (3.00).
Empirical Results
Descriptive Statistics
(Insert Table 1 (Insert Table 2 about here) Table 3 presents the first set of results relating to the research questions of the paper. It displays the correlations among the net buying activity measures for the six trade-size categories and the two measures of earnings surprise. NETBUY i is the net buying activity (or the buying versus selling imbalance) at the time of the earnings announcement for trading-size class i. AFE is the analysts' forecast error and SRWFE is the seasonal random walk forecast error.
Correlations
(Insert Table 3 about here)
Results strongly suggest the data are consistent with our expectations. Note that for the two smallesttrade categories, those trading 500 shares or less, the correlations between net buying activity and SRW errors are higher than between net buying activity and analyst forecast errors. On the other hand, for the two largesttrade categories, net buying activity is more highly correlated with analyst forecast errors than with SRW errors.
Specifically, for those initiating the smallest trades (less than 500 shares) the correlation with SRW forecast errors is 0.069 and is significantly greater than zero at the 0.01 level, while the corresponding correlation with analyst forecast errors is only 0.009 and is insignificantly different from zero. For those initiating the largest trades, the ordering is reversed and the correlation between net buying activity and analyst forecast errors is 0.051, while the corresponding correlation with SRW error is only 0.037. Both correlations are significant at the 0.01 level. Taken alone, these results suggest that the smallest traders respond only to SRW signals, while the largest traders respond to both signals. Before concluding that the largest traders respond to both signals, however, the positive correlation between seasonal random walk and analysts' forecasts must be taken into account.
Means Tests with Consistent and Contradictory Earnings Signals
The four interior cells of Table 4 (Insert Table 4 about here)
The last column of the first row indicates that when holding SRW forecast errors positive and allowing the analyst forecast error to go from positive to negative, large traders become significantly greater sellers (t = 4.85; z = 3.86) but the results for small traders are insignificant (t = -1.92; z = -1.13). Taken alone, the results presented in the first row suggest that, while large traders respond to analyst forecast errors in the expected direction, at best small traders ignore analysts' forecast errors.
The second row holds the SRW error negative while again allowing the sign of the analyst forecast error to change. The results for large traders are similar to those of the first row-they are neutral when the analyst forecast error is positive (NETBUY 6 = -0.024, not significant) and they are strong net sellers when the analyst forecast error is negative (NETBUY 6 = -0.130, significant at the 0.01 level). Again the cell in the rightmost column indicates that when holding the sign of the SRW forecast error constant (negative for the second row), the activity of large traders depends significantly on the sign of the analyst forecast error (t = 2.58; z = 2.92). By contrast, tests whose results are reported in the table's very bottom row indicate that when holding the sign of the analyst forecasts constant, changing the sign of the SRW forecast has a very small and insignificant effect on the buying behavior of large traders. Specifically, when holding analyst forecast error positive (negative) the t-statistic for an effect of the sign of the SRW forecast error on the propensity of large traders to buy is 0.38 (-0.37).
Comparison of the first and second rows also indicates that small traders exhibit much less propensity to buy when the SRW forecast error is negative. The table's bottom row shows this difference to be highly significant both when the analyst forecast error is positive (t = 5.49; z = 5.13) and when the analyst forecast error is negative (t = 5.35; z = 5.71). Results presented in column three are mixed with the t-statistic suggesting that small traders respond in the opposite direction of analysts' forecast error (t = -2.10) and the z-statistic suggesting that small traders ignore analyst forecast errors (z = -0.32). Table 4 provides some information not indicated by the correlations. Unconditionally, consistent with Lee (1992) , small traders tend to be net buyers of stock around earnings announcements. Lee speculates that this may be due to the earnings announcement bringing the stock to the attention of individual investors.
The largest traders, however, tend to be net sellers around the time of earnings announcements. We did not anticipate this mean effect for large traders and are not sure why it occurs. It is possible that large investors, knowing that small investors tend to be net buyers around earnings announcements, use this opportunity to sell shares of stock. 16 But we do not explore possible explanations for large traders' propensity to sell or small traders' propensity to buy during earnings-announcement periods. We focus rather on the differences in net buying activity across the signs of the two types of forecast errors for the two types of traders.
The results presented in Table 4 confirm the implications of the correlations of Table 3 by suggesting that small traders respond positively to SRW forecast errors and ignore analyst forecast errors. Moreover, the results in Table 4 suggest that large traders respond positively to analyst forecast errors but they do not respond to SRW forecast errors. Since the inferences drawn from the analyses in Tables 3 and 4 are clearly influenced by the positive correlation between analyst and SRW forecast errors (+0.51 for our coded variables), we next examine the relationship between trade size and earnings forecast errors in a multivariate regression setting. Fama and MacBeth (1973) describe the time-series t-statistic.
Regression Tests of Net Buying Activity on Earnings Signals
18 Footnote 3 points out that even though investors see the same earnings figure, different investors may interpret it differently. For this study we use earnings provided by Compustat for both forecast errors. Alternatively, I/B/E/S provides earnings that have been "adjusted by I/B/E/S Data Research to be comparable to the estimates made by analysts" (from documentation provided by I/B/E/S). When we replace Compustat actual earnings with earnings that I/B/E/S believes are more value relevant, the relation between the largest traders' net buying activity and analyst forecast errors becomes stronger. The coefficient on AFE in Table   5 increases from 0.138 to 0.211, while the relations between small traders' net buying activity and both forecast errors are essentially unchanged. We interpret this as a test of the joint hypothesis that I/B/E/S succeeds in providing more value-relevant earnings figures (confirmed by non-tabulated tests of association between errors and returns) and that large traders successfully back out at least some non-value-relevant or less persistent components of announced earnings. 20 error, the smallest traders respond in the opposite direction of analyst forecast errors. 17 The coefficient on the SRW forecast error, on the other hand, is significantly positive (standard t-statistic = 7.51; time-series tstatistic = 5.33). The SRW coefficient of 0.148 indicates that the difference in the announcement-period buysell imbalance between observations in top and bottom SRW error deciles is 14.8% of normal nonannouncement trades-after controlling for analyst forecast errors. For the SRW errors, the second column, findings for those who trade 500 shares, provides results that are similar to (but weaker than) the smallest traders, but gives little indication that these investors trade in the opposite direction of analyst forecast errors.
(Insert Table 5 about here)
At the other end of the spectrum the net buying activity of the largest traders, those who initiate trades for 5000 shares or more, is significantly positively related to analyst forecast errors (standard t-statistic = 3.66;
time-series t-statistic = 4.78). The coefficient on the analyst forecast errors is 0.138 and is similar in magnitude to the coefficient for the smallest traders on the SRW forecast errors of 0.148. 18 Unlike the smallest traders, the largest traders respond to analyst forecast errors, but appear to ignore SRW errors (standard t-statistic = 1.35; time-series t-statistic = 1.28). Results for the second largest traders, those trading 1100 to 4900 shares, are similar to, but somewhat weaker than those of the largest traders-they seem to 19 We replicate Table 5 on the sample quartiles based on firm size. In each case the results are similar to those reported for the complete sample. Specifically, for small-trader net buying, the coefficient on SRWFE is positive and significant at at least the 5% level in four all cases, while the coefficient on AFE is insignificant in three cases and negative and significant for the largest quartile. For large-trader net buying, the coefficients on SRWFE are all insignificant, while the coefficients on AFE are positive significant at at least the 5% in all four cases. Inferences are identical when we form quartiles based on analyst following or fraction of shares held by institutions instead of market capitalization.
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respond positively to analyst forecast errors (standard t-statistic = 3.57; time-series t-statistic = 3.82), but not to SRW forecast errors standard t-statistic = 0.61, time-series t-statistic = 0.51). Finally, notice that the 1000-share traders respond positively to both earnings signals. It is possible that this level of trade size, for most of our sample period the largest trade size for which market makers' posted quotes were guaranteed, attracts some sophisticated and some unsophisticated investors.
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The results presented in Tables 3, 4 , and 5 consistently show that at least one subset of investors, those who initiate the smallest trades, holds earnings expectations that resemble SRW forecasts. These expectations are clearly naive in the sense that they are less accurate than analysts' forecasts. The results also consistently show that those investors who initiate the largest trades base their buy and sell decisions on expectations that more closely resemble analysts' forecasts. We conclude that different classes of investors, categorized by trade size, base their buy and sell decisions on significantly different information sets. Our results clearly support our alternative statements of the first and second hypotheses.
Why is the net buying activity of small traders negatively correlated to analysts' forecast errors when controlling for SRW forecast errors? Price movements are more highly associated with analyst forecast errors (signals seen by large traders) than with SRW forecast errors. (We confirm this later in Table 9 .) As the price moves in response to the analyst forecast error, this has an inverse effect on small traders' demand functions.
Consider a simple case where announced earnings equals the SRW forecast but is above the analyst forecast.
The positive analyst forecast error causes an increase in large-trader demand and their trading causes prices 20 More formally, Varian (1986) specifies investor demand as D i = J" (< i -P), where J is the investor's risk aversion, "
is the precision of the investor's information, < i is the investors's subjective valuation, and P is the market price. For small traders, holding SRWFE constant holds < i constant, while increasing AFE increases P, decreasing demand and decreasing the net buying of small traders. 21 To confirm this we replicated the first regression reported in Table 5 after adding the three-day abnormal return around the earnings announcement (ANCAR) as an independent variable. The coefficient on AFE is no longer significantly different from zero and the coefficient on ANCAR is significantly negative.
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to rise. Thus, while small traders' subjective value of the stock does not change, their demand declines as the price rises, inducing them to sell. 20, 21 So, conditional on the SRW forecast error, small traders will trade opposite to the analysts' forecast error. This suggests that in general small traders should trade opposite to overall price movements. The next subsection examines this issue.
Barclay-Warner Cumulative Price Change Analysis
Following Barclay and Warner (1993) , we attribute the fraction of the stock's three-day announcement-period cumulative price change to trades of the different size classes. We do this primarily to determine if trades of any size category move opposite to the cumulative price change over the interval.
Some researchers believe that investors who hold naive beliefs trade opposite to the direction prices should move and this may give rise to earnings-related anomalies. This is our third hypothesis: Transactions of small traders run counter to price movements that occur at the time of earnings announcements. Table 6 displays the results of the Barclay-Warner analysis. The most salient point from Table 6 is that trades of the smallest traders, those initiating trades of less than 500 shares, tend to move prices in the wrong direction. That is, say that in a particular case a stock price moved up a total of 4% in the three days around an earnings announcement. On average, the cumulative price change occurring on transactions initiated by the smallest traders (compared to the prices of the preceding trades) would be down over 1% (-27 .1% x 4% = -1.084%). While this does not prove that small traders actually impede stock prices from moving to where they would be without the actions of small traders, it leaves the door open to that possibility.
(Insert Table 6 about here)
Also note that it is the 1000 share trades that move prices the most. 1000 share trades make up 32.3% of all transactions and are responsible for 79.9 % of the total three-day cumulative price movement. This result is consistent with Harris and Schultz (1997) . Conversely, while the largest trades make up 7.1% of all transactions, they are responsible for only 3.9% of the total cumulative price movement. These results seem inconsistent with those of the prior tests that show the largest traders have earnings expectations that most closely resemble analysts' forecasts. One possibility is that many large trades are shopped and negotiated beforehand, giving market participants the opportunity to front run and market makers time to arrange for offsetting trades. Both of these activities would reduce the importance of large trades in discovering new prices as measured by Barclay and Warner (1993) . The analysis in the next section addresses this issue by examining the association between net buying activity for the different trade-size categories and abnormal stock returns in the three-day announcement period. Table 7 presents the results of regression tests of abnormal stock returns on the net buying activity of different trade-size categories. The independent variable is ANCAR, the three-day announcement-period size-adjusted return and the explanatory variables are the net buying measures for each of the six trade-size categories. The first 6 results columns of Table 7 (Insert Table 7 
Regression Tests of Association Between Net Buying Activity and Stock Returns
Small-Trader activity and the Stock-Price Response to Earnings
This section more directly addresses the issue of whether the smallest traders, who tend to trade opposite to stock-price movements, actually have sufficient power to affect prices. These tests are similar to those of Walther (1997) . She hypothesizes that the marginal investor of smaller firms, that are followed by fewer analysts and have a smaller fraction of their shares held by institutions, is more likely to be unsophisticated. Since the sophistication of investors is increasing in each of Walther's firm-specific variables, we expect a negative correlation between Walther's variables and our measures of small-trader activity. We therefore test for a relation between our measure of small-trader activity and the importance of SRW forecast errors in explaining stock returns around earnings announcements, both before and after controlling for the firm-specific variables used by Walther. Table 8 presents correlations (Pearson below the diagonal, Spearman above) among three firmspecific variables used by Walther-fraction of shares held by institutions, firm size, and analyst following-and three measures of small-trader activity from our data. The three measures of small-trader activity are: SMALL TRADES 1 , the number of trades less than 500 shares initiated in the three-day earnings announcement window divided by the firm's total share volume over that period; SMALL TRADES 2 , the number small trades divided by the total number of sample trades of all size categories; and SMALL TRADES 3 , the sample percentile of the number of small trades minus the sample percentile of total number of trades of all size categories initiated over the same time period. As expected, in all cases our measures of small-trader activity are significantly negatively correlated with institutional holding and analyst following. The relation between small-trades and firm size, however, is less clear with some correlations significantly negative, some significantly positive, and some insignificant.
(Insert Table 8 about here) Table 9 presents results of regression tests of the three-day, size-adjusted stock returns around earnings on the two types of forecast errors, analyst and SRW, and several multiplicative variables. The multiplicative variables are intended to capture the effect of small-trader activity on the relative ability of analyst and SRW forecast errors to explain stock-price movements around earnings announcements. The six columns of results presented in Table 9 are arranged in three pairs. Each pair of columns corresponds to a different specification of small-trader activity as described above. The first column of each pair provides results without controlling for institutional holding, the natural log of firm size, and analyst following, while the second column presents results of tests that do control for these variables.
For Table 9 , the form of the forecast errors is the same as used throughout this paper: coded scores based on the decile of the observation within the distribution of forecast errors in the same calendar quarter.
Each of the firm-specific characteristics and small-trader activity variables is standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. This transformation does not affect t-statistics or significance levels, but makes the coefficients comparable across variables.
Consider the first column of results presented in Table 9 . The intercept is significantly positive indicating that stock returns tend to be positive around earnings announcements. (See Chambers and Penman, 1984 .) The coefficients on each of the two measures of earnings surprise, analyst and SRW forecast errors, are also significantly positive, indicating that they are positively correlated with the stock-price movements around earnings announcements.
Near the bottom of the table, note that the coefficient on the first of two multiplicative variables, SMALL TRADES i * AFE, is significantly negative (t = -2.78). This implies that when small-trading is high relative to, in this case, share volume, the affect of analyst forecast errors on stock-price movements is diminished. In contrast, the next row shows that the coefficient on the second multiplicative variable, SMALL TRADES i * SRWFE, is significantly positive (t = 3.27), implying that small-trader activity tends to increase the impact of seasonal random walk forecast errors on stock-price movements around earnings announcements. Results presented above suggest that small traders respond to a naive earnings signal (SRW errors), while larger traders respond to a more sophisticated signal (analysts' errors). This test suggests that when small traders make up a relatively high fraction of transactions, stock prices respond more to the naive signal and less to the superior signal. Finally, the last row of data labeled "Effect of SMALL TRADES / Prob value based on F-test" shows that the coefficients on the two multiplicative variables are not equal-smalltrader activity shifts weight from analyst forecast errors to SRW errors.
The second column of results shows that this finding holds when controlling for variables used by
Walther (1997)-institutional holding, the natural log of firm size, and analyst following. Note also that results for the other two measures of small-trader activity are similar to those of the first, whether or not Walther's control variables are used. When each of the control variables is used independently (not tabulated), we confirm Walther's results-each shifts weight from SRW errors to analyst errors. So, our tests confirm
Walther's results and extend them to a more direct measure of unsophisticated trading-the prevalence of small trades.
In the last set of tests we address the issue of whether the net buying by small traders and, therefore, stock returns around earnings announcements, can be (partially) predicted in advance. If small traders use a systematically inferior earnings expectation model, then their errors should contain a predictable component.
Further, if small traders and/or others who hold this earnings expectation affect prices, then stock price movements at the time of earnings announcements should be positively associated with this predictable component of their earnings forecast error.
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By adding the analyst forecast to and subtracting it from the SRW forecast error, the SRW forecast error can be bifurcated into predictable and unpredictable components:
The second term of the right side of the above equation is the predictable component of the SRW forecast error. Note that this variable is known with certainty prior to the earnings announcement-it does not depend on announced earnings. Under the joint hypothesis that some investors' earnings expectations resemble SRW forecasts and that these investors affect stock prices, the predictable component of the SRW forecast error should be positively correlated with stock returns around earnings announcements. Table 10 contains results of attempts to predict both net buying activity of the smallest and largest trade-size categories and abnormal returns around earnings announcements. For these tests, PSRWFE, the predictable component of the SRW forecast error, is a coded score ranging from -0.5 to +0.5 based on its within-quarter decile. The first two columns of results show that the predictable component of the SRW forecast error is positively associated with the net buying activity of small investors (t = 7.90), but not of large investors (t = 1.54). Large investors whose earnings expectations resemble analysts' forecasts, can predict in advance when small-trader net buying will be unusually large or small.
The third column of Table 10 presents the results when the three-day abnormal return around earnings announcements, ANCAR, is regressed on the predictable component of the SRW forecast error, PSRWFE.
Note that PSRWFE, which is known with certainty prior to the earnings announcement, is significantly positively associated with abnormal returns around the earnings announcement (t = 4.68). Because PSRWFE is coded with a range of 1.0, the 1.30 coefficient implies a difference in three-day abnormal returns between highest and lowest PSRWFE deciles of 1.30%. The last three columns of Table 10 indicate that in cases where there are more small trades, PSRWFE has significantly greater power to predict future abnormal returns. Collectively, these results suggest that small investors whose expectations resemble the naive SRW earnings forecast affect market prices.
Conclusion
In this paper we present results indicating that different types of investors, who can be identified by trade size, behave as if they use different information sets when making their buy and sell decisions. Those investors who initiate small trades seem to base their decisions on more naive or less sophisticated information than those who initiate large trades. Specifically, we find that small traders seemingly ignore earnings signals based on analysts' forecasts while responding to signals of a less accurate time-series model. Large traders on the other hand ignore the naive time-series signals and respond to analysts' forecast errors. Bernard and Thomas (1990) hypothesize that post-earnings announcement drift is caused by investors whose beliefs resemble SRW forecasts. Other researchers, e.g., Walther (1997) and Bhattacharya (2001) , suggest that it may be small investors who hold these beliefs. Our results support and extend the idea that small investors do indeed hold beliefs that resemble SRW forecasts. We show further that the trades of small investors around earnings announcements are opposite to the direction of stock price movements. Finally, we provide evidence that investors whose earnings expectations resemble SRW forecasts actually affect stock prices. While our results are consistent with the idea that small traders impede stock-price movements at the time of earnings announcements and, therefore, play a role in causing earnings-related anomalies, our analysis falls far short of proving that to be the case. While we believe this paper contributes to the discussion of investor sophistication and the effect of unsophisticated investors on market prices, we also believe this remains a fertile area for future research. TABLE 3 Correlations between forecast errors and net buying activity for different trade-size categories.
AFE is the analysts' forecast error and is defined as actual earnings per share minus the average of all forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement deflated by price. SRWFE is the seasonal random walk forecast error and is defined as actual earnings per share minus reported earnings per share for the same fiscal quarter of the prior year deflated by price. NETBUY 1 -NETBUY 6 are adjusted net purchases for different trade-size categories as noted. NETBUY i is (average daily event-period purchases minus average daily event-period sales for category i) minus (average daily non-event period purchases minus average daily non-event period sales for category i) divided by (average daily non-event period trades for category i). The event period is the three-day interval centered on the earnings announcement date as reported on Compustat. The non-event period is two three-day periods centered ten trading days before and after the earnings announcement date. AFE is the analysts' forecast error and is defined as actual earnings per share minus the average of all forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement deflated by price. SRWFE is the seasonal random walk forecast error and is defined as actual earnings per share minus reported earnings per share for the same fiscal quarter of the prior year deflated by price. NETBUY 1 -NETBUY 6 are adjusted net purchases for different trade-size categories as noted. NETBUY i is (average daily event-period purchases minus average daily event-period sales for category i) minus (average daily non-event period purchases minus average daily non-event period sales for category i) divided by (average daily non-event period trades for category i). The event period is the three-day interval centered on the earnings announcement date as reported on Compustat. The non-event period is two three-day periods centered ten trading days before and after the earnings announcement date. 
TABLE 7
Regressions of abnormal stock returns, at the time of and following earnings announcements, on net buying activity for different trade-size categories.
The dependent variable is ANCAR, the three-day cumulated firm return minus the equally-weighted return for the same period for the Nasdaq market-capitalization decile assigned by CRSP. NETBUY 1 -NETBUY 6 are adjusted net purchases for different trade-size categories as noted. NETBUY i is (average daily event-period purchases minus average daily event-period sales for category i) minus (average daily non-event period purchases minus average daily non-event period sales for category i) divided by (average daily non-event period trades for category i). The event period is the three-day interval centered on the earnings announcement date as reported on Compustat. The nonevent period is two three-day periods centered two weeks before and after the earnings announcement date. ANALYSTS is the number of analysts providing quarterly earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement. SMALL TRADES 1 is the number of trades less than 500 shares initiated in the three-day earnings announcement window divided by the firm's total share volume over that period. SMALL TRADES 2 is the number of trades less than 500 shares initiated in the three-day earnings announcement window divided by the total number of sample trades of all size categories. SMALL TRADES 3 is the sample percentile of the number of trades less than 500 shares initiated in the three-day earnings announcement window minus the sample percentile of total number of trades of all size categories. Regressions of three-day abnormal stock returns at the time of earnings announcements on forecast errors, small trader activity, and firm-specific variables.
The dependent variable is the three-day abnormal stock return around the earnings announcement. AFE is the analysts' forecast error and is defined as actual earnings per share minus the average of all forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement deflated by price. SRWFE is the seasonal random walk forecast error and is defined as actual earnings per share minus reported earnings per share for the same fiscal quarter of the prior year deflated by price. INST. FRAC. is the fraction of the firm's shares held by institutions that file Form 13f with the SEC in the calendar quarter prior to the earnings announcement. SIZE is the market capitalization of the firm in thousands of dollars at the beginning of the calendar year. ANALYSTS is the number of analysts providing quarterly earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement. SMALL TRADES 1 is the number of trades less than 500 shares initiated in the three-day earnings announcement window divided by the firm's total share volume over that period. SMALL TRADES 2 is the number of trades less than 500 shares initiated in the three-day earnings announcement window divided by the total number of sample trades of all size categories. SMALL TRADES 3 is the sample percentile of the number of trades less than 500 shares initiated in the three-day earnings announcement window minus the sample percentile of total number of trades of all size categories. Regressions of net buying activity and three-day abnormal stock returns at the time of earnings announcements on the predicted component of seasonal random walk (SRW) forecast errors and measures of small-trader activity.
NETBUY 1 and NETBUY 6 are adjusted net purchases for different trade-size categories as noted.NETBUY i is (average daily event-period purchases minus average daily event-period sales for category i) minus (average daily non-event period purchases minus average daily nonevent period sales for category i) divided by (average daily non-event period trades for category i). The event period is the three-day interval centered on the earnings announcement date as reported on Compustat. The non-event period is two three-day periods centered two weeks before and after the earnings announcement date. ANCAR is the three-day cumulated firm return minus the equally-weighted return for the same period for the Nasdaq market-capitalization decile assigned by CRSP. PSRWFE is the predictable component of the seasonal random walk forecast error and is defined as analysts' forecast of earnings per share minus reported earnings per share for the same fiscal quarter of the prior year deflated by price. SMALL TRADES 1 is the number of trades less than 500 shares initiated in the three-day earnings announcement window divided by the firm's total share volume over that period. SMALL TRADES 2 is the number of trades less than 500 shares initiated in the three-day earnings announcement window divided by the total number of sample trades of all size categories. SMALL TRADES 3 is the sample percentile of the number of trades less than 500 shares initiated in the three-day earnings announcement window minus the sample percentile of total number of trades of all size categories. 
